Nixon's
and Kissinger's dangerous games in the Vietnam War – The Madman
strategy
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Recent
documents show that the hardcore branch of the US policy during the
Vietnam war, was playing dangerous games with North Vietnam and the
Soviets, in order to drag the other side to negotiations.
We
see today a similar game played by the neocons in Ukraine and
Asia-Pacific. In the new Cold War, neocons are playing more dangerous
games with Russia and China, as they try to persuade that they will
not hesitate to proceed in a nuclear strike against both their
rivals, because they see that the Sino-Russian bloc threatens the US
global sovereignty.
From
National Security Archive:
“Nixon's
and Kissinger's Madman strategy during the Vietnam War included
veiled nuclear threats intended to intimidate Hanoi and its patrons
in Moscow. The story is recounted in a new book, Nixon's Nuclear
Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam
War, co-authored by Jeffrey Kimball, Miami University professor
emeritus, and William Burr, who directs the Archive's Nuclear History
Documentation Project. Research for the book, which uncovers the
inside story of White House Vietnam policymaking during Nixon's first
year in office, drew on hundreds of formerly top secret and secret
records obtained by the authors as well as interviews with former
government officials.”
“With
Madman diplomacy, Nixon and Kissinger strove to end the Vietnam War
on the most favorable terms possible in the shortest period of time
practicable, an effort that culminated in a secret global nuclear
alert in October of that year. Nixon's Nuclear Specter provides the
most comprehensive account to date of the origins, inception, policy
context, and execution of 'JCS Readiness Test' —the equivalent of a
worldwide nuclear alert that was intended to signal Washington's
anger at Moscow's support of North Vietnam and to jar the Soviet
leadership into using their leverage to induce Hanoi to make
diplomatic concessions. Carried out between 13 and 30 October 1969,
it involved military operations around the world, the continental
United States, Western Europe, the Middle East, the Atlantic,
Pacific, and the Sea of Japan. The operations included strategic
bombers, tactical air, and a variety of naval operations, from
movements of aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines to
the shadowing of Soviet merchant ships heading toward Haiphong.”
“The
authors also recount secret military operations that were part of the
lead-up to the global alert, including a top secret mining readiness
test that took place during the spring and summer of 1969. This
mining readiness test was a ruse intended to signal Hanoi that the US
was preparing to mine Haiphong harbor and the coast of North Vietnam.
It is revealed for the first time in this book.”
“Another
revelation has to do with the fabled DUCK HOOK operation, a plan for
which was initially drafted in July 1969 as a mining-only operation.
It soon evolved into a mining-and-bombing, shock-and-awe plan
scheduled to be launched in early November, but which Nixon aborted
in October, substituting the global nuclear alert in its place. The
failure of Nixon's and Kissinger's 1969 Madman diplomacy marked a
turning point in their initial exit strategy of winning a favorable
armistice agreement by the end of the year 1969. Subsequently, they
would follow a so-called long-route strategy of withdrawing U.S.
troops while attempting to strengthen South Vietnam's armed forces,
although not necessarily counting on Saigon's long-term survival.”
“In
1969, the Nixon's administrations long-term goal was to provide
President Nguyen Van Thieus government in Saigon with a decent chance
of surviving for a reasonable interval of two to five years following
the sought-after mutual exit of US and North Vietnamese forces from
South Vietnam. They would have preferred that President Thieu and
South Vietnam survive indefinitely, and they would do what they could
to maintain South Vietnam as a separate political entity. But they
were realistic enough to appreciate that such a goal was unlikely and
beyond their power to achieve by a military victory on the ground or
from the air in Vietnam.”
“Giving
Thieu a decent chance to survive, even for just a decent interval,
however, rested primarily on persuading Hanoi to withdraw its troops
from the South or, if that failed, prolonging the war in order to
give time for Vietnamization to take hold in order to enable Thieu to
fight the war on his own for a reasonable period of time after the US
exited Indochina. In 1969, Nixon and Kissinger hoped that their
Madman threat strategy, coupled with linkage diplomacy, could
persuade Hanoi to agree to mutual withdrawal at the negotiating table
or lever Moscows cooperation in persuading Hanoi to do so. In this
respect, Nixon's Nuclear Specter is an attempt to contribute to
better understanding of Nixon and Kissinger's Vietnam diplomacy as a
whole.”
Full
report:
These
materials are reproduced from www.nsarchive.org with the permission
of the National Security Archive.
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